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CP17/26 clarifies how UK firms must evidence cyber resilience

CP17/26 and GC26/9 tell banks, insurers, FMIs and SYSC 15A firms how to evidence cyber resilience under UK rules, with AI and quantum notes kept separate.

CP17/26 clarifies how UK firms must evidence cyber resilience

The Prudential Regulation Authority, the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority have asked banks, insurers, financial market infrastructures and SYSC 15A firms to show how existing governance, operational-resilience, operational-risk and third-party rules apply to a cyber incident, in PRA CP17/26 and FCA GC26/9.

The regulators published the consultation on November 19, 2026. Annex 1 organises the expectations into six chapters and names the National Cyber Security Centre Cyber Assessment Framework as the supervisory benchmark. Paragraph 2.5 says supervisors will use those expectations when they enforce the Annex 2 rules. The FCA GC26/9 page states that final guidance is expected in the first half of 2027, once responses have come in by February 26, 2027.

Key facts that the consultation states

  • The Bank of England consultation page records publication on November 19, 2026 and a response deadline of February 26, 2027, sent to GC26-9@fca.org.uk and CP17_26@bankofengland.co.uk.
  • Paragraph 1.9 covers UK banks, designated investment firms, Solvency II insurers including Lloyd's, Bank-supervised financial market infrastructures and SYSC 15A firms, with qualifying cryptoasset firms from October 25, 2027.
  • The regulators' November 19, 2026 news release states that October 2026 brought the second-highest monthly count of cyber incidents reported to the FCA in five years, 52% above the May 2025 peak.
  • The same release, citing the joint artificial-intelligence survey, states that 88% expect a moderate or high frontier-AI cyber impact within two years, and that 64% named vulnerability management and patching as the greatest extra attention.
  • Paragraphs 4.30 to 4.38 put the central annualised cost at approximately £7.0 million over ten years across 427 PRA-regulated firms (£4.2 million), 10 Bank-regulated financial market infrastructures (£140,000) and about 1,700 FCA solo-regulated firms (£2.6 million).
  • Paragraphs 4.40 and 4.41 apply IBM's July 30, 2024 benchmark of £6.05 million for a UK financial-services data breach to 33 incidents reported in 2024, an illustrative £200 million a year, of which £7.0 million is about 3.5%.

Methodology and the primary documents behind the consultation

The analysis uses documents issued on November 19, 2026. The Bank of England page is the publication record for CP17/26. The operative text is the 63-page GC26/9 PDF, including the draft supervisory statement and FCA Finalised Guidance in Annex 1 and the rule map in Annex 2. The news release supplies the incident statistic, the survey percentages and the remarks of Nikhil Rathi and Katharine Braddick. The companion pages on artificial intelligence and quantum computing are separate publications from the same day. Comparison uses Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, New York's 23 NYCRR Part 500, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Technology Risk Management Guidelines of January 18, 2021 together with Notice FSM-N14. The enforcement example is the FCA Final Notice to Equifax Limited dated October 3, 2023. The jurisdictions in scope are the United Kingdom, the European Union, New York and Singapore.

What the draft supervisory statement asks firms to evidence

CP17/26 and GC26/9 are the joint consultation through which the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority propose a supervisory statement and Finalised Guidance on cyber risk and resilience. Paragraph 1.3 of CP17/26 and GC26/9 states that the proposals would not introduce new rules, and paragraph 1.8 states that the artificial-intelligence and quantum effective-practices documents do not set supervisory expectations and sit outside this consultation. Paragraph 1.9 covers UK banks, Solvency II insurers including Lloyd's, Bank-supervised financial market infrastructures and FCA firms subject to SYSC 15A, with qualifying cryptoasset firms joining on October 25, 2027. Six chapters run from board accountability and a named senior manager, ordinarily SMF24, through an inventory, protection, detection, recovery and assurance mapped to the Cyber Assessment Framework. The FCA page expects final guidance in the first half of 2027, after the close on February 26, 2027.

Chapter 3 places cyber risk on top of the impact-tolerance programme in SS1/21 and the outsourcing register in SS2/21. The board needs understanding sufficient to challenge management, and management information has to be clear and timely. Where the Senior Managers and Certification Regime applies, ownership should ordinarily sit with the Chief Operations Function, SMF24. Chapter 4 asks for an inventory of data, hardware, software and third-party dependencies, refreshed after a major incident. Chapter 5 requires least privilege, identity checks before access, and multi-factor authentication where access could affect an important business service.

Paragraph 3.30 says the 2025 CBEST thematic, published on January 20, 2026, found detection to be a common weakness. Chapter 6 asks firms to monitor key risk areas and log events. Chapter 7 requires a response plan with escalation, including the Sector Response Framework, and recovery of important business services within impact tolerances. Chapter 8 asks for testing, including threat-intelligence-led work where appropriate. Paragraph 2.14 sets the Cyber Assessment Framework as the benchmark, and paragraph 2.18 lets NIST and ISO standards stand as supporting evidence while the firm still demonstrates the UK outcomes.

How the UK package compares with DORA, New York and Singapore

Jurisdiction / regulatorEffective dateScopeKey requirementPenalty / sanction
United Kingdom (PRA, Bank of England, FCA) Opened November 19, 2026; closes February 26, 2027 UK banks, Solvency II insurers, Bank-supervised FMIs and SYSC 15A firms, including cryptoasset firms from October 25, 2027 Chapters 3 to 8: a named senior manager, an inventory, detection, recovery inside impact tolerances and CAF assurance Equifax Limited, October 3, 2023: £11,164,400 under section 206 of FSMA
European Union (DORA) Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 has applied since January 17, 2025 Article 2 financial entities and critical ICT third-party providers in Articles 31 to 44 Articles 5 to 16 and 28 to 30: ICT risk management, incident reporting and third-party controls Article 35(8): up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover, daily, for up to six months
New York (NYDFS) Part 500 since March 2017; amended text the Department describes as effective in November 2023 Licensees under New York banking, insurance or financial-services law Cybersecurity programme, multi-factor authentication and notice to the Department within 72 hours Healthplex, Inc., August 14, 2025: a $2 million civil penalty
Singapore (MAS) Technology Risk Management Guidelines, January 18, 2021; Notice FSM-N14 effective May 10, 2024 FSM-N14 licensees and designated-payment-system operators Six controls on administrative accounts, patching, security standards, network devices, malware and authentication Issued May 9, 2024 under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022; breach of the notice is an offence under that Act

Sources: the Bank of England CP17/26 page, the FCA GC26/9 PDF, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the NYDFS cybersecurity regulation, the Healthplex announcement of August 14, 2025, MAS Notice FSM-N14 and the Technology Risk Management Guidelines of January 18, 2021. The table was last updated on November 22, 2026.

The legal form of CP17/26 differs from the Digital Operational Resilience Act and from New York's cybersecurity regulation in where the binding duty sits. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 has applied since January 17, 2025, and Article 35(8) allows a periodic penalty payment of up to 1% of a critical ICT third-party provider's average daily worldwide turnover, charged daily for up to six months. Part 500 of 23 NYCRR has been in force since March 2017, and on August 14, 2025 the New York State Department of Financial Services announced that Healthplex, Inc. will pay a $2 million penalty. Singapore's Notice FSM-N14, effective May 10, 2024, makes six cyber-hygiene controls binding. The UK consultation keeps the binding duties in SYSC 15A, SS1/21, SS2/21 and the Bank's Fundamental Rules, and it uses the new text as the lens for supervising those duties.

Paragraph 2.18 still expects impact tolerances and the named senior manager to be demonstrated where a DORA register or a New York programme already exists, and paragraph 2.5 makes that evidence the lens for Annex 2. Industry Spread has tracked the parallel split in DORA's third-party oversight against UK and US resilience rules and in how DORA's cloud oversight divides the EU, the UK and the US. The report on the Cyber Resilience Act's 24-hour reporting clock for crypto-wallet makers covers a product statute, while CP17/26 addresses the firms that consume the technology.

"Technology moves fast, and so do cyber threats. The financial sector has a crucial role in tackling those threats, including through products like cyber insurance. Our response shouldn’t always be more rules. Firms have asked us for clarity about what good cyber resilience looks like. This guidance provides it, helping strengthen their resilience, protect clients and the services they rely on."

— Nikhil Rathi, chief executive, Financial Conduct Authority (Bank of England)

Why the Equifax Final Notice still frames third-party cyber risk

On October 3, 2023 the Financial Conduct Authority issued a Final Notice to Equifax Limited, reference number 739000, imposing £11,164,400 under section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The FCA announced the outcome on October 13, 2023. The notice records a 30% Stage 1 discount and states that the penalty before that discount would have been £15,949,200. It finds breaches of Principles for Businesses 3, 6 and 7.

Section 2 of the Equifax Limited Final Notice matches the third-party themes in CP17/26. Equifax Limited transferred UK consumer data to Equifax Inc for processing on servers in Alpharetta, Georgia. Intruders obtained the personal data of approximately 13.8 million people in the UK, alongside approximately 147.9 million people in the United States and 19,000 people in Canada. The notice says scanning ran from March 10, 2017, that Equifax Inc detected the access on July 29, 2017, and that by August 29, 2017 the parent had determined UK data might have been reached. Equifax Inc informed the UK firm on September 7, 2017, approximately five minutes before the public announcement at 21:30 British Summer Time. The notice describes the access as foreseeable, and it finds that later public statements on the UK impact fell short of Principle 7.

SS2/21 and SYSC 8 express that duty today. Chapters 4 to 7 ask for that dependency in the inventory, controls that follow the asset, and escalation when the first facts sit with another legal entity. Leaving it out of the cyber inventory repeats the structure priced at £11,164,400. One penalty on that scale exceeds a decade of the modelled PRA annualised cost of £4.2 million.

What banks, brokers, FMIs and compliance teams are expected to evidence

A UK bank that already runs an SS1/21 programme will be read against all six chapters. The board pack needs a cyber risk appetite and a named senior manager, ordinarily SMF24. The service map needs a join to the asset inventory, including third parties. Identity records need least privilege and multi-factor authentication on paths that can move an important service. The response plan needs a tested route back inside the impact tolerance. Paragraph 4.30 prices the PRA population's central one-off cost at £14.9 million and the annual ongoing cost at £2.5 million.

A broker's position follows the population it sits in. A fund manager, custodian or other designated investment firm, an enhanced-scope firm, and a UK recognised investment exchange should produce the six-chapter pack, scaled under paragraph 1.13. A smaller broker outside SYSC 15A sits with the firms paragraph 1.12 encourages to read the draft and to consider Cyber Essentials. Payment and e-money institutions are named in the SYSC 15A list, and regulation 98 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 already requires management of operational and security risks. For an FMI, Annex 2(c) points to Fundamental Rules 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10. The Bank's estimate for the 10 FMIs is a one-off £730,000 and an annualised £140,000.

Compliance teams will be sampled on the crosswalk from each chapter to the rule, the senior manager, the last test and the open remediation. From March 18, 2027 that file also has to meet SUP 15.18, SUP 15.19 and SUP 16.33. Qualifying cryptoasset firms join SYSC 15A on October 25, 2027, the gateway described in the report on the FCA's final crypto rules and the October 2027 gateway. Where a provider also sits on the 19-provider critical-third-party list, the UK file should record the SS2/21 assessment beside the provider's incident duties.

"Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, complex and dangerous. Regulators need confidence both that firms have strong cyber controls and that they can detect, contain and recover quickly from incidents. Today’s proposed guidance builds on latest understanding to help firms do that."

— Katharine Braddick, chief executive officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority and deputy governor at the Bank of England (Bank of England)

What follows the consultation close and the companion publications

Paragraph 2.23 says the regulators expect a Policy/Feedback Statement that includes the final supervisory statement and Finalised Guidance. The FCA GC26/9 page expects that guidance in the first half of 2027, after responses close on February 26, 2027. The seven questions cover proportionality, the Cyber Assessment Framework, interoperability and the split between incremental cost and spend firms would incur anyway. Comments on the companion notes can travel with those responses.

The artificial-intelligence note pushes firms towards continuous exposure management, with human oversight that can change an outcome, and names poisoning, prompt injection and autonomous agents. The quantum note asks for a cryptographic inventory and a board-level migration, citing a 2025 survey summarised in March 2026 that puts a cryptographically relevant quantum computer as likely within 15 years. Section 6.6 keeps the firm accountable where a third party supplies the cryptography. Both notes sit outside the formal expectations.

SUP 15.18, SUP 15.19 and SUP 16.33 come into force on March 18, 2027, so incident notification and the material-third-party register can be live before the final statement. The Bank's H2 2026 Systemic Risk Survey already places cyber among the risks judged to carry the greatest impact on the UK financial system.

TL;DR

CP17/26 and GC26/9, published on November 19, 2026, tell banks, Solvency II insurers, Bank-supervised financial market infrastructures and SYSC 15A firms how to evidence cyber resilience under rules they already hold. Six chapters cover governance through assurance, benchmarked to the National Cyber Security Centre Cyber Assessment Framework. Responses close on February 26, 2027, and the FCA page expects final guidance in the first half of 2027. Companion notes on artificial intelligence and quantum computing sit outside the formal expectations. The central annualised cost is approximately £7.0 million, about 3.5% of an illustrative £200 million built from 33 reported data breaches and IBM's £6.05 million UK benchmark.

FAQ on scope, cost and the final supervisory statement

Which firms fall inside the CP17/26 and GC26/9 population?

Paragraph 1.9 places UK banks, building societies, PRA-designated investment firms and Solvency II insurers, including Lloyd's, inside the draft, with Bank-supervised central counterparties, securities depositories and recognised payment systems. FCA firms subject to SYSC 15A are included, covering enhanced-scope firms, UK recognised investment exchanges, payment and e-money institutions, and qualifying cryptoasset firms from October 25, 2027. Paragraph 1.12 encourages credit unions and firms outside that list to consider the draft and Cyber Essentials.

What should a bank with an operational-resilience programme be ready to show?

The bank should join its SS1/21 service map and impact tolerances to a current inventory of assets, data and third-party dependencies. The board pack should carry a cyber risk appetite, with ownership ordinarily on SMF24 where the Senior Managers Regime applies. Identity controls should show least privilege and multi-factor authentication on paths that can affect an important business service. Recovery should be tested against a severe scenario and should restore the service inside the tolerance. Paragraph 2.14 names the Cyber Assessment Framework as the benchmark.

How do the artificial-intelligence and quantum notes sit beside the consultation?

Both notes were published on November 19, 2026 by the same three authorities. Paragraphs 1.8 and 2.21 place them beside the draft as effective practice, outside the formal expectations. The artificial-intelligence note describes continuous exposure management and human oversight that can change an outcome. The quantum note asks for a cryptographic inventory and a board-level migration towards post-quantum cryptography. The survey cited with the notes says 88% of respondents expect a moderate or high frontier-AI cyber impact within two years.

What cost does the consultation attribute to the expectations?

Paragraphs 4.30 to 4.38 estimate a combined annualised cost of approximately £7.0 million over ten years: £4.2 million for 427 PRA-regulated firms, £140,000 for 10 financial market infrastructures and £2.6 million for about 1,700 FCA solo-regulated firms. The PRA central one-off cost is £14.9 million. Paragraph 4.41 says avoided losses of about 3.5% of an illustrative £200 million, drawn from 33 breaches and IBM's £6.05 million benchmark, would match the annualised spend.

CP17/26 clarifies how firms meet rules already listed in Annex 2, and paragraph 2.5 says supervisors will enforce those rules with the statement as the lens. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 has applied since January 17, 2025, and Article 35(8) sets a periodic penalty of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover on a critical ICT third-party provider. Part 500 of 23 NYCRR has been in force since March 2017, and the August 14, 2025 Healthplex, Inc. settlement imposed a $2 million penalty. Paragraph 2.18 lets overseas compliance support the UK demonstration of those outcomes.

When do the regulators expect the final supervisory statement to appear?

The consultation closes on February 26, 2027. Paragraph 2.23 says the regulators expect a Policy/Feedback Statement containing the final supervisory statement and Finalised Guidance, and the FCA GC26/9 page expects that guidance in the first half of 2027. SUP 15.18, SUP 15.19 and SUP 16.33 come into force on March 18, 2027. Qualifying cryptoasset firms enter the SYSC 15A population on October 25, 2027. Views go to GC26-9@fca.org.uk and CP17_26@bankofengland.co.uk.

This article is informational analysis only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, tax, or investment advice, because regulatory frameworks change frequently and interpretation depends on facts and circumstances, so primary documents and official regulator guidance supersede summaries and firms should consult qualified legal counsel and their relevant supervisory authority before taking any action.

Reporting by Rick Steves. Filed 22 November 2026, 13:26 GMT.

Senior Reporter, Regulation and Fintech

Rick Steves has seen business and economics through many lenses. He joined the financial services industry in 2009, and has been a financial journalist since 2011.

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