Fluidkey shut its wallet after unauthorised relayer payouts
Fluidkey took its privacy wallet offline after unauthorised transfers. Bitquery ties $1.58 million to an attacker while DeFiLlama still leaves the loss blank.

Fluidkey, which describes itself as self-custodial, told users on November 19, 2026 to keep clear of its website and app, then said every service had gone offline at 18:05 UTC. Fluidkey later said the private keys controlling user funds stayed on the device, while Bitquery's November 20 review shows the company's own relayer, the service that broadcasts user transactions and pays the gas, paying funds out for 36 minutes. Bitquery tied at least $1.58 million of those payouts to wallets it links to one attacker across six chains. DeFiLlama's hack log still leaves that dollar loss blank.
What the relayer paid out
Bitquery's scan from 17:10 to 18:10 UTC separates three buckets: about $1.58 million to attacker-linked wallets between 17:28 and 18:04 UTC, about $349,000 to addresses with an established history, and about $65,000 left unclassified. About $277,000 of the history bucket moved during the drain to a wallet in use since 2024, which Bitquery reads as one user shifting funds on Ethereum (ETH) and Base. Fluidkey has not published a dollar total of its own, and SlowMist's hack archive still shows an empty loss field and marks the method unknown.
Fluidkey's first post, at 18:20 UTC on November 19, said the team was aware of a security incident affecting users and told them to keep clear of the website and the app. Its update at 20:17 UTC said unauthorised transactions had stopped at 18:05 UTC, when it took all services offline, and that it was working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance's emergency response line, on the investigation and on tracing the funds. Bitquery's last relayer transaction that day landed at 18:04:59 UTC, one second before the shutdown Fluidkey described.
Base accounted for about $837,000 of the attacker-linked sum and Ethereum for about $660,000. Most of that money was USD Coin (USDC) and Tether (USDT). Six wallets then deposited 881.6 ETH into Tornado Cash between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC, about $1.57 million at the $1,778 ether price Bitquery used for that conversion. After the Binance hot-wallet loss, Tether and Circle could freeze stablecoins still held as stablecoins, a tool that misses ether already inside Tornado Cash. The same hour also carried about $13,500 of tokenised stock from Ondo Global Markets, including NVIDIA, Apple, Alphabet and S&P 500 tokens, and about $5,500 of that reached the attacker.
On November 20, Fluidkey said the wallet was back on version 1.79.22 for web, iOS and Android, that earlier builds stay offline, and that users turn sending back on under Settings, then Update. The company said the attacker used flaws in a third-party logging tool to obtain session data, prepared unauthorised transfers on Fluidkey's servers, and had them signed when a user opened the app. It said that preparation path is closed in that release and that the private keys stayed on the device. It will contact affected users individually and publish the post-mortem. In a separate note it warned about impersonation and said its team will not reach out privately through social media.
Bitquery saw a few of the unclassified payouts continue to Coinbase or Binance deposit addresses, an on-chain observation separate from any statement by those exchanges. Lighter's halt after a leaked API key and BTCPay Server's warning on drained hot wallets point to the same first control, which is to stop the software that submits transactions. Ben DiFrancesco, founder and chief executive at ScopeLift, wrote on November 21: "You have to scan every existing wallet ever created to find the ones that you control. To avoid making a user do this on their local machine, it was delegated to a server." He called that delegation a disclosed tradeoff.
A May 24, 2024 assessment by Dedaub warned that a compromised Fluidkey server could serve users harmful code, leaving the stealth-address setup resting on that server. Bitquery, writing before Fluidkey's logging-tool account, left the cause open. For advisers, the episode sits beside the self-custody path in the SEC's Advisers Act proposal and beside France's reporting line for self-custodied crypto. Holding the spending key still leaves a user depending on a relayer, a viewing server and a logger to assemble what that key signs.
Until that post-mortem, a risk register can book Bitquery's attacker-linked $1.58 million and keep the $65,000 unclassified bucket and the $349,000 history bucket on separate rows. If the post-mortem's total diverges from $1.58 million, the likely source of the gap is those owner-looking flows, or activity on a chain outside Bitquery's six-chain scan.
This article is informational analysis only and is not financial, investment, or trading advice. Cryptocurrencies are highly volatile and can lose substantial value rapidly. Past performance and historical patterns do not guarantee future results. Do your own research and consult a regulated financial adviser before making any investment decision.
Reporting by Karthik Subramanian. Filed 21 November 2026, 11:12 GMT.



